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APOCALYPSE NOW? 
Richard L. Marcus* 
AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MAss TOXIC DISASTERS IN THE 
COURTS. By Peter H. Schuck. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press. 1986. Pp. ix, 347. $25. 
Rambo [displaying photo of his Vietnam platoon]: And there's Delmar, 
right in the back. We had to put him in the back because he is so big. 
If we didn't, he'd take up the whole picture. Look how big he is. 
Delmar's Mother: Delmar's gone. 
Rambo: What time will he be back? 
Mother: He died. 
Rambo: What? 
Mother: Died last summer. 
Rambo: Died? How? 
Mother: Cancer. Brought it back from 'Nam. All that orange stuff, 
they spread it all around. Cut him down to nothing. I could lift him 
off the sheet. 
First Blood 1 
[C]ertain products have achieved such national notoriety due to their 
tremendous impact on the consuming public, that the mere mention of 
their names - Agent Orange, Asbestos, DES, MER/29, Dalkon Shield 
- conjure images of massive litigation, corporate stonewalling, and in-
frequent yet prevalent, "big money" punitive damage awards. 
- Judge Spencer Williams2 
For more than two decades, the Vietnam war has hung over the 
American social and political system. From time to time fallout from 
the war has intruded into the American judicial system as well. Some 
tried to use the judiciary to interdict military operations in Southeast 
Asia, but the courts refused to become involved. 3 Similarly unsuccess-
* Professor of Law, University of Illinois. B.A. 1969, Pomona College; J.D. 1972, Univer-
sity of California, Berkeley. - Ed. I am indebted to Linda Schoemaker and Nancy Van Winkle 
for research assistance. 
1. Anabasis Investments, N.V. 1981. This is the opening scene in the movie. After leaving 
Delmar's mother, in a state of turmoil about the news of Delmar's death, Rambo encounters the 
unfriendly sheriff and drifts into his own apocalypse. 
2. In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" l.U.D. Prod. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887, 
892 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom. A.H. Robins 
Co. v. ABED, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983). 
3. E.g., Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970) (denying Massachusetts leave to file bill 
of complaint in Supreme Court to challenge constitutionality of Vietnam War); McArthur v. 
Clifford, 402 F.2d 58 (4th Cir.) (rejecting petitions for habeas corpus relief filed by reservists 
ordered to Vietnam who asserted their orders were illegal because there had been no declaration 
of war), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1002 (1968); Mora v. McNamara, 387 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir.) (seek-
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fu1 were governmental attempts to have the courts suppress the Penta-
gon Papers.4 More recently, General William Westmoreland has gone 
to court to challenge a CBS story that charged him with misleading 
American political leadership about the actual progress of the war.5 
Significant though this litigation was, it has been eclipsed in dimen-
sion by personal injury lawsuits brought by veterans exposed to the 
herbicide Agent Orange. These cases began slowly in the late 1970s, 
but by the time the resulting class action approached trial they had 
mushroomed into a litigation colossus. There never was an in-court 
confrontation between the veterans and the chemical companies, how-
ever. Instead on May 7, 1984, the ninth anniversary of the withdrawal 
of the U.S. troops from Vietnam, the class action was settled for $180 
million, the largest personal injury settlement in American litigation 
history. The settlement prompted immediate and substantial attention 
in the print media, 6 and the Agent Orange problem has since been 
featured in a made-for-TV movie. 7 But it was never legally established 
that Agent Orange has actually harmed anyone, since the same ail-
ments were found in people not exposed to the herbicide. Indeed, the 
claims of veterans who opted out of the class action were ultimately 
rejected for lack of proof of causation. 
Obviously the story of the Agent Orange litigation deserved to be 
told, and Professor Schuck's book does an excellent job of recounting 
the many twists and turns it took from its modest beginnings to its 
celebrated conclusion. Unlike the tendentious recent books on the as-
ing declaratory judgment that military activity in Vietnam was "illegal"), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 
934 (1967). The court did grant certiorari in other cases involving fallout from the war. See, e.g., 
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) (association of Reserve 
members lacks standing to challenge membership in Armed Forces Reserve of members of Con· 
gress); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (prosecution for burning draft card as part 
of antiwar protest not forbidden by first amendment). 
4. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam). 
5. For a description ofthls litigation, see R. ADLER, RECKLESS DISREGARD (1986); see also 
Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979) (officer who reported atrocities by American troops in 
Vietnam brought defamation suit against CBS for questioning the accuracy of his reports). 
6. The New York Times ran a prominent front page story on the settlement, backed up with a 
spread of subsidiary stories on inside pages. See Blumenthal, Veterans Accept $180 Million Pact 
on Agent Orange, N.Y. Times, May 8, 1984, at l, col. 5. The Times later expressed editorial 
doubt over the propriety of such a large settlement absent proof Agent Orange harmed the class. 
See Orangemail: Why It Got Paid, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1985, at A34, col. 1. Both Time and 
Newsweek ran full page stories on the settlement. See Lamar, Winning Peace with Honor, TIME, 
May 21, 1984, at 39; Press, A Fast Deal on Agent Orange, NEWSWEEK, May 21, 1984, at 56. 
7. Unnatural Causes (NBC television broadcast, Nov. 10, 1986) (starring John Ritter and 
Alfre Woodard). The New York Times explained that the film "presents the case for the Vietnam 
veterans who are demanding redress for their exposure to the herbicide Agent Orange. • • . This 
is drama with a point of view, and the producers make the most of the opportunity, leaving no 
doubt as to who their heroes and villains are." O'Conner, NBC Film on Agent Orange Dispute, 
N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1986, at C23, col. 4. For another example of general media attention to 
the effects of Agent Orange, see Distelheim, There's a Time Bomb Ticking Inside Me, FAMILY 
CIRCLE, Oct. 15, 1985, at 46, detailing health problems that a former flight attendant who flew in 
Vietnam attributes to Agent Orange. 
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bestos and Dalkon Shield litigation, 8 Professor Schuck's study is not 
designed to expose corporate evil in America. It is instead a thought-
ful evaluation of the way in which the Agent Orange problem was 
processed by the courts, written with explanations of legal doctrine 
that should provide laymen with an unparalleled inside glimpse of the 
details of contemporary complex litigation. 
For the professional reader, Professor Schuck treats the case as a 
"harbinger of mass toxic tort cases yet to come" (p. 13) and therefore 
seeks to use the Agent Orange story as a springboard for apocalyptic 
visions of litigation as a social response to the problem of exposure to 
toxics. While laudable, this effort seems somewhat misdirected. 
Schuck draws generally on the massive literature criticizing the tort 
system as a whole, but this case is extraordinary in ways that make it a 
poor vehicle for such criticisms. Indeed, as the flawed studies of the 
asbestos and Dalkon Shield litigations make clear, the tort system 
seems a necessary tool even in mass exposure cases. 
Despite Professor Schuck's inclinations, it seems to this reader that 
his story raises more significant questions about procedural matters. 
Although some commentators express enthusiasm for class action in 
mass tort cases,9 the difficulties encountered by plaintiffs' counsel in 
the Agent Orange litigation provide reason for caution in use of the 
device. Much more significantly, the book provides a detailed expose 
8. On asbestos, see P. BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE AsBESTOS INDUSTRY 
ON TRIAL (1985). As Professor Schuck rightly observes, this book is "tendentious." P. 303 n.7. 
On the Dalkon Shield, see S. ENGELMAYER & R. WAGMAN, LORD'S JUSTICE: ONE JUDGE'S 
BATILE TO EXPOSE THE DEADLY DALKON SHIELD I.U.D. (1985). This book has been properly 
denounced for its uncritical acceptance of highly questionable crusading by Judge Miles Lord to 
expose wrongdoing by the A.H. Robins Co. See Book Note, 99 HARV. L. REv. 875 (1986). 
9. For example, in 1984 Professor Charles Alan Wright argued as follows in support of class 
certification in In re School Asbestos Litig., 594 F. Supp. 178 (E.D. Pa. 1984): 
I was an ex officio member of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules when Rule 23 was 
amended, which came out with an Advisory Committee Note saying that mass torts are 
inappropriate for class certification. I thought then that was true. I am profoundly con-
vinced now that that is untrue. Unless we can use the class action and devices built on the 
class action, our judicial system is simply not going to be able to cope with the challenge of 
the mass repetitive wrong •... 
Transcript of Oral Argument, July 30, 1984, at 106, In re School Asbestos Litig., 594 F. Supp. 
178 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (No. 83-0268), quoted in H. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS 
§ 17.06, at 373 (2d ed. 1985). Despite arguments for aflirmance by Professor Arthur Miller, as 
counsel for the class, the Third Circuit reversed certification of a mandatory class action for 
punitive damages in that case while affirming certification of a (b)(3) opt-out class. See In re 
School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Celotex Corp. v. School 
Dist. of Lancaster, 107 S. Ct. 182 (1986). 
Concluding that Rule 23 as presently written will not suffice for such cases, Professor Mul-
lenix has recently proposed federal legislation to require class action treatment for "truly nation-
wide mass-injury cases." Mullenix, Class Resolution of the Mass-Tort Case: A Proposed Federal 
Procedure Act, 64 TEXAS L. REv. 1039, 1046 (1986). Her solution to the adequacy of representa-
tion problem is to direct that only state attorneys general be allowed to prosecute such cases. See 
id. at 1083-86. Given the desire of the veterans to control their own lawyers in the Agent Orange 
litigation, however, it may be that this alternative will not sit well with such plaintiff class mem-
bers. On the other hand, many veterans ultimately concluded their lawyers were not responsive 
to their desires in Agent Orange. 
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of one episode in another movement that has recently generated mas-
sive literature - vigorous judicial promotion of settlement. We dis-
cover that the $180 million settlement was crafted by Judge Jack 
Weinstein, who privately selected this figure as the "right" amount 
and then employed an array of extremely effective prods to persuade 
the lawyers on both sides to accept it. If there is an apocalyptic vision 
to be drawn from the Agent Orange litigation, it is that less talented 
judges may regularly use such prods to coerce acceptance of the re-
sults they conclude are more just than formal adjudication would 
probably yield. Although Professor Schuck identifies this problem, he 
provides little insight into resolution of the fundamental tension be-
tween this sort of judicial activity and the traditional role of judges in 
deciding cases according to their legal merits. 
I. THE STORYlO 
Ironically, Agent Orange11 was supposed to be the model herbi-
cide, a synthetic substitute for existing weed killers that were thought 
to be more dangerous. Between 1965 and 1971, some ten million gal-
lons of Agent Orange were sprayed over as much as ten percent of 
South Vietnam's land area because it was especially effective in defoli-
ating the woody and broad-leaved vegetation that grew so profusely 
there, sheltering Viet Cong activities. Unfortunately, a by-product of 
the manufacture of Agent Orange was contamination with a dioxin 
called TCDD, which has been described as "perhaps the most toxic 
molecule ever synthesized by man" (p. 18). The concentration of this 
dioxin in the products of different manufacturers varied dramatically, 
and Agent Orange produced by different manufacturers was often 
mixed rather indiscriminately in Vietnam before it was used. As a 
result, the herbicide actually sprayed there had TCDD concentrations 
ranging from one part per million to 140 parts per million. Overall, 
some 240 pounds of TCDD were probably deposited there. American 
soldiers in Vietnam undoubtedly came in contact with it as a result, 
but there is no way now to know the frequency of such exposure or the 
concentration of the Agent Orange involved. 
10. Professor Schuck concentrates almost entirely on the internal activities of the plaintiffs' 
side and the settlement promotion by Judge Weinstein. Notably absent is any substantial insight 
into defendants' views of the case. In part, this slant may reflect greater willingness on the 
plaintiffs' side to talk to the professor, but he did interview at least some defense counsel. See pp. 
301-02. This focus on the plaintiffs' handling of the litigation is markedly different from the 
recent books on asbestos and Dalkon Shield litigation, and a welcome shift from their 
tendentiousness, see note 8 supra. But the limited attention given to defendants' development of 
the herbicide and handling of the litigation leaves the reader with little basis for assessing the 
charge of "Orangemail." See note 6 supra. 
11. Agent Orange got its name from the orange stripe on container drums manufacturers 
used to distinguish this mixture from other synthetic herbicides of similar chemical configuration 
identified by other colors - blue, white, purple, green, and pink. P. 16. The lurid ring of the 
name was fortuitous; one suspects that Agent White would pack a lot less wallop in the media. 
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When they came home, the Vietnam veterans confronted unprece-
dented public indifference, and sometimes hostility. Over time, many 
also began to fall ill, 12 although they didn't initially connect these dis-
orders to Agent Orange. But Maude de Victor, a benefits counselor at 
the Chicago regional office of the Veterans Administration, thought 
she discerned a pattern. The statistics she gathered eventually were 
aired as a special report by a Chicago television station in 1978. This 
program prompted new Vietnam veterans' organizations13 to focus on 
Agent Orange, which one organizer saw as a "metaphor for the Viet-
nam veterans' helplessness" (p. 41). These organizations also started 
looking for lawyers to represent veterans exposed to Agent Orange. 
The saga of the Agent Orange litigation began with a 1978 tele-
phone call to a Long Island lawyer by Paul Reutershan, who had 
flown through clouds of Agent Orange serving in a helicopter crew in 
Vietnam. Although he was something of a health nut, neither drink-
ing nor smoking, Reutershan was dying from virulent stomach cancer. 
He wanted to sue the chemical companies who made Agent Orange 
because he believed it had caused his disease. Reutershan died in late 
1978, but he left a legacy: his lawsuit eventually became the Agent 
Orange class action. 
Pursuing a nationwide class action was the idea of Victor Yan-
nacone, a Long Island lawyer whom activist veterans persuaded to get 
involved in the case. Y annacone emerges as one of the two striking 
figures in Professor Schuck's book (the other being Judge Weinstein). 
Described by some as "more than a lawyer ... a passionate partisan, a 
crusader" (p. 43), he was viewed more skeptically by his colleagues, 
one of whom characterized him as "a legend in his own mind" (p. 
103). He claimed, for example, to have invented the term "environ-
mental law" and to have launched the campaign to ban DDT. After 
he retooled Reutershan's suit as a nationwide class action against all 
12. Whether Vietnam veterans fell ill unusually frequently is unclear. A recent study by the 
Centers for Disease Control indicates that although Vietnam veterans experienced significantly 
higher mortality than non-Vietnam veterans these heightened levels of death do not relate to 
disease. The Centers compared mortality among approximately 9,000 Vietnam veterans and 
9,000 non-Vietnam veterans and found that overall mortality was 17% higher among Vietnam 
veterans. See Centers for Disease Control, Postservice Mortality Among Vietnam Veterans, J. 
A.M.A., Feb. 13, 1987, at 790, 791. But the areas in which the Vietnam veterans showed higher 
rates of mortality were motor vehicle accidents and accidental poisoning deaths (mostly by 
drugs). Id. at 792. In terms of death by disease, the most significant difference is that the non-
Vietnam veterans experienced much higher rates of death due to diseases of the circulatory sys-
tem. Id. tab. 4, at 793. The researchers characterized this finding as "surprising." Id. at 795. 
More recently, the Centers for Disease Control abandoned a Congressionally mandated study of 
the effects of Agent Orange on American ground soldiers in Vietnam because too few soldiers 
were found who were exposed to significant levels of the herbicide. Boffey, U.S. Halting Study on 
Agent Orange, N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1987, at 1, col. 1 (natl. ed.). 
13. The established veterans' organizations, the American Legion and Veterans of Foreign 
Wars, were often unsympathetic to the problems of Vietnam veterans, so the returning Vietnam 
veterans tended to establish their own groups. P. 25. For these fledgling organizations, the 
Agent Orange issue was a made-to-order organizing tool. 
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manufacturers of Agent Orange and filed it in federal court in early 
1979, he began barnstorming across the country trying to excite inter-
est in the suit among veterans. Throughout the years of litigation that 
followed, Y annacone continued to personify the suit for many veter-
ans, and to identify with their yearning for something more than judi-
cial relief. As he told the groups of veterans, "We can't win, but I'll at 
least get you your day in court" (p. 47). 
Yannacone also wanted to retain personal control of the litigation 
and he therefore joined with defendant Dow Chemical Company's 
lawyer in asking the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to send 
all Agent Orange cases to the Eastern District of New York, where his 
class action was pending (p. 49). His strategy was soon threatened by 
a pair of Texas lawyers who had filed over 100 individual suits and 
had no interest in subservient roles in Y annacone's suit. Partly in re-
sponse to this challenge, in the fall of 1979, Yannacone recruited a 
group of Long Island personal injury lawyers and made a "super sales-
man . . . pitch to their imaginations, patriotism, idealism, and profit 
motives" (p. 51) to join him. Thus was born Yannacone & Associates, 
a loosely-organized consortium of small firms pledging $2,000 each to 
the case as well as committing substantial time. For nearly four years, 
this grab-bag legal team headed up the largest tort case in history even 
though many of its members rapidly concluded they could not work 
with their generalissimo, Y annacone. 
Meanwhile, the case had been assigned to U.S. District Judge 
George Pratt, who methodically addressed a variety of legal issues 
raised by pre-trial maneuvering. The chemical companies filed third-
party complaints for indemnity against the United States and raised 
the "governmental contractor'' defense, asserting that they were im-
mune from liability because they were only following the government's 
orders. Judge Pratt eventually held that the government was immune 
from suit under Feres v. United States, 14 set forth ground rules for the 
governmental contractor defense, ruled that a class action would be 
certified, and in December 1980 scheduled the governmental contrac-
tor defense for separate trial in mid-1983.15 As the trial approached, 
however, Judge Pratt realized that the problem of causation was cen-
tral to all other matters and decided that all issues in the case would be 
tried together.16 
The prospect of preparing the whole case for trial was more than 
the financially strapped members of Y annacone & Associates could 
tolerate. The rancor between Yannacone and his colleagues already 
14. 340 U.S. 135 (1950). 
15. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). [Hereinaf-
ter citations lacking case names refer to In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig.] 
16. 565 F. Supp. 1263 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). Professor Schuck comments that "the wonder is 
that it had taken so long" to recognize the problem. P. 101. 
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"had erupted into all-out warfare" (p. 105), and in September 1983 a 
reconstituted Plaintiffs' Management Committee (PMC) was substi-
tuted as counsel for the class.17 Y annacone was quickly thrust to the 
periphery of the litigation, although he remained the champion of 
many veterans and regularly appeared at hearings with a phalanx of 
fatigue-clad veterans to serve as a self-described golem to Judge 
Weinstein. 
When Judge Pratt was elevated to the Second Circuit, the Agent 
Orange case was reassigned to Judge Weinstein, who summoned all 
the lawyers to his chambers for a get-together in October 1983. In the 
course of the afternoon, he "turned the Agent Orange case around, 
inside out, and on its head" (p. 112). Most dramatically, he set the 
entire case for trial on May 7, 1984, barely six months away. He also 
indicated that he would backtrack on Judge Pratt's dismissal of claims 
against the United States three years before. Beyond that, he observed 
that the central problem in the case was causation, allowing that liabil-
ity was "highly doubtful" (p. 113). Finally, he suggested that the best 
outcome would be a settlement, a goal Professor Schuck tells us was 
uppermost in the judge's mind from the outset (p. 143). 
The early trial date galvanized the lawyers into a frenzy of trial 
preparation. On the PMC in particular, there was "a mood of near 
panic" that led to new recruitment efforts to raise money for the case 
(p. 120). Eventually six prominent lawyers were persuaded to "in-
vest" a total of $1,450,000 in the case in return for seats on the PMC 
and a promise that, if there were a fee award, they would be repaid 
threefold "off the top" even though they were to take no substantial 
responsibility for the actual preparation or presentation of the case.18 
17. 571 F. Supp. 481 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). Judge Pratt noted that "[c]ontinuation of the present 
pattern of representation of the plaintiffs through a group of attorneys, rather than by a single 
lead counsel, is in the best interests of the plaintiffs." 571 F. Supp. at 483. The extent of Judge 
Pratt's appreciation of the disarray within Y annacone & Associates is a source of enduring un-
easiness about the case. See Part III.A infra. 
18. Pp. 120-21. When this arrangement became public, Yannacone characterized it as "300 
percent interest ... [charged by] your friendly neighborhood loan shark." Moore, Fee-Splitting 
Agreement Draws Attention of Agent Orange Judge, Legal Times, Nov. 5, 1984, at 1, col. 2, 7, col. 
2. Under pressure from the judge, plaintiffs' counsel renegotiated the agreement somewhat. The 
judge later rejected a challenge by one lawyer on the PMC who was awarded $1.3 million for his 
time on the case but would have to shift $1 million of his fee to the investors. See 611 F. Supp. 
1452 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). 
This unorthodox financing scheme is defended in Coffee, The Unfaithful Champion: The 
Plaintiff As Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 5, 
57-65. In part, he reasons as follows: 
In Agent Orange, the plaintiffs' team was insolvent, and it had to attract new capital to bring 
the action to trial. Although those members on the management committee who could not 
advance further funds stood to lose compensation for their considerable time already ex-
pended in the action, this time was a sunk cost that would be disregarded by a rational 
decisionmaker. To put it simply, had additional funds not been secured, this time would 
probably have had little value because the action would have had to be abandoned or settled 
very cheaply. While a 300% return may seem excessive in absolute terms, there is no appar-
ent reason to distrust the bargaining among the attorneys that produced this result; those 
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Despite the infusion of capital, the PMC remained so disorganized 
that the judge directed that discovery continue through the trial. As 
the "exhausted" PMC lawyers "staggered" toward trial, one activist 
veteran, appalled by their lack of preparation, launched a nationwide 
campaign to get veterans to write the judge asking him to postpone the 
trial (p. 142). 
Pursuing his interest in settlement, Judge Weinstein appointed spe-
cial settlement masters in late April, and they began lobbying for a 
compromise. All the lawyers were directed to report to the court-
house over the weekend before trial was to begin for around-the-clock 
settlement negotiations. When they arrived, the sides were kept sepa-
rate and the masters, sometimes accompanied by the judge, pressured 
both sides to moderate their positions. For example, the judge told the 
defendants' lawyers he intended to adopt the plaintiffs' theory that any 
manufacturer that knew its product would be mixed with herbicides 
manufactured by others was liable for injuries caused by the mixture. 
Under this theory, all the defendants would be liable if causation could 
be proved (pp. 154-55). Yet when speaking to the PMC lawyers, the 
judge said, according to one lawyer: 
I have carried you plaintiffs all this time. I have decided a lot of ques-
tions in your favor that I could have decided the other way. And I want 
you to know that at nine o'clock Monday morning I am through carry-
ing you. . . . [R]emember, I just don't think you have got a case on 
medical causation. [pp. 160-61] 
Buffeted by these pitches, genuinely alarmed by the implications of 
what the judge and masters had told them, and worn down by the 
ordeal of preparing for trial, the lawyers all agreed, at three in the 
morning on the day the trial was to begin, to settle for $180 million. 
who agreed to subordinate or shift their claims to the newly arrived attorneys had every 
reason to bargain at arm's length and no reason to pay an excessive return. 
Id. at 6().61. More generally, it may be that investment in law firms may be the wave of the 
future. See Kaplan, Want to Invest in a Law Firm?, Natl. L.J., Jan. 19, 1987, at 1, col. 4 (report-
ing proposed ethical rules in North Dakota and the District of Columbia that would allow lay 
investment in law firms despite risks that lawyers may become subservient to non-lawyers). 
Professor Coffee's analysis may make perfect sense as a matter of economics. Indeed, it has 
been suggested in the derivative action context that the most effective enforcement device would 
be to give the attorney· the entire recovery. See Scott, Corporation Law and the American Law 
Institute Corporate Governance Project, 35 STAN. L. REv. 927, 941 n.43 (1983) (noting that this is 
"a thought too horrible to contemplate for at least another decade"). But these concepts do not 
fit into traditional class action analysis. To the contrary, the courts have carefully separated the 
interests of class counsel and class representative. Thus, in Cotchett v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., 56 
F.R.D. 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), the court held that the class representative could not be a law 
partner of the class counsel because that would create a conflict of interest for the representative, 
who would benefit financially from increased attorney's fees. One court has even refused to 
certify a class because class counsel promised the class representative that he would not sue the 
representative to recover the costs of the action if it were unsuccessful. See In re Mid-Atlantic 
Toyota Antitrust Litig., 93 F.R.D. 485 (D. Md. 1982). Whatever objections one might make to 
these decisions, they show that economic analysis and class action analysis are not precisely 
congruent; even if the economists would be satisfied with a "headless class action," the class 
action rules as presently interpreted forbid it. For the Second Circuit's reaction to the arrange· 
ment in Agent Orange, see note 27 infra. 
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The last-minute settlement did not end the litigation. Almost im-
mediately, it was roundly attacked by many veterans (possibly egged 
on by Y annacone ). Some argued that $180 nzjllion was far too small a 
sum, an objection that was reinforced by a Newsweek report that 
defendants "privately chortled that they had walked away after paying 
only '10 cents on the dollar.' " 19 More fundamentally, many claimed 
that the settlement had frustrated their prime goal for the suit - hav-
ing their day in court - a point reinforced by the fact that the chemi-
cal companies had denied any wrongdoing in the settlement. Through 
five fairness hearings across the country, Judge Weinstein patiently lis-
tened as objectors made these points repeatedly, but he approved the 
settlement anyway.20 Turning to the question of fees for plaintiffs' 
counsel, which he could set because they were to be paid out of the 
settlement pot, the judge allowed a very low amount, barely five per-
cent of the settlement figure.21 He explained that although he believed 
that counsel had "done as much with this case as anyone could" (p. 
195), the result was not due to this work. Instead, "[i]t was due to the 
basic problem that the defendants had in trying to get rid of a case. 
Had you been permitted to go forward with all your work, in my opin-
ion, you would have gotten nothing from the case" (p. 194). After 
protracted consideration of how to pay out the money, he adopted a 
distribution plan that minimized costs associated with proving entitle-
ment to payment even though that would tend to give money to those 
who may have suffered no harm.22 Meanwhile, in suits brought by 
veterans who opted out of the class action, the judge granted defen-
dants summary judgment on the ground that plaintiffs had no credible 
proof of causation even though they had experts who were willing to 
testify that their maladies were due to exposure to Agent Orange. 23 
19. Press, supra note 6, at 56. 
20. 618 F. Supp. 623 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). 
21. 611 F. Supp. 1296 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). 
22. 611 F. Supp. 1396 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). As Professor Schuck points out, a strong argument 
could be made for applying traditional tort principles to distinguish between class members actu-
ally harmed by Agent Orange and those not so harmed, but the concomitant administrative 
difficulties make this possibility unworkable. See pp. 206-23. 
23. 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); 611 F. Supp. 1267 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). The judge's 
reasoning was that, since epidemiological studies had showed no higher incidence of the maladies 
suffered by plaintiff in the exposed population than in the general population, the experts' conclu-
sions were too speculative to support recovery. Professor Schuck calls this the "single most far-
reaching ruling" in the case. P. 234. 
For criticism of Judge Weinstein's summary judgment decision, see Nesson, Agent Orange 
Meets the Blue Bus: Factfinding at the Frontier of Knowledge, 66 B.U. L. REv. 521 (1986). 
Professor Nesson argues that the judge adopted "an erroneous and hard-edged statistical concept 
of probability, which obscures the difference between law and science," id. at 526, and concludes 
that the expert opinions should have sufficed to get to the jury. He recognizes, however, the 
impact of that conclusion: 
Imagine what would have happened had [opt-out plaintiff] Lilley won. In that event Judge 
Weinstein would have determined that a rational jury could have concluded under the civil 
standard of proof that Lilley's exposure to Agent Orange caused his injuries. But if a jury 
could rationally reach that conclusion for Lilley, must it not also follow that a jury could 
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Finally, having tied up all the loose ends in the litigation, Judge Wein-
stein turned to a courtroom full of lawyers, veterans, and onlookers 
before entering his chambers and said, "Goodbye everybody. If I 
don't see you again, I want you to know I have affection for all of 
you." With a "genial wave," he was gone (p. 252). 
Of course there were appeals from the judge's rulings. In April 
1987, a panel of the Second Circuit issued a series of opinions deciding 
these appeals. Principally authored by Judge Ralph Winter, Professor 
Schuck's former colleague at the Yale Law School, and laced with 
references to Professor Schuck's book,24 these opinions affirmed al-
most all of Judge Weinstein's rulings. In particular, they affirmed his 
certification of a class action and approval of the $180 million settle-
ment25 and the grant of summary judgment against the claims of the 
opt-out plaintiffs.26 The appellate court did, however, invalidate the 
fee-sharing agreement that rewarded the investors.27 Perhaps this fi-
nally closes the Agent Orange chapter in American litigation 
history.28 
11. APOCALYPSE IN THE TORT SYSTEM? 
Telling the story is not enough. As Professor Schuck recognizes, 
rationally conclude that dioxin caused cancer among the population of soldiers exposed in 
Vietnam? Were Judge Weinstein to allow a medical diagnostician's opinion to satisfy Lil· 
ley's burden of proving causation, he could not refuse to allow a similar expert opinion to 
satisfy the burden of proof for the class, regardless of what epidemiology had to say. 
Id. at 536. 
24. See 818 F.2d 145, 152, 154-55 (2d Cir. 1987); 818 F.2d 179, 182 (2d Cir. 1987); 818 F.2d 
187, 193 (2d Cir. 1987). 
25. 818 F.2d 145· (2d Cir. 1987). The court noted that "it was essentially a settlement at 
nuisance value." 818 F.2d at 171. 
26. 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987). The focus of the plaintiffs on appeal was the judge's refusal 
to credit their expert testimony on causation, but the appellate court placed principal reliance on 
the military contractor defense, which plaintiffs' counsel did not even brief. See 818 F.2d at 190 
& n.5. For an illustration of the continuing vitality of the Feres doctrine, see, e.g., United States 
v. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. 3054 (1987); United States v. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. 2063 (1987). 
27. 818 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1987). The court reasoned that shifting fees from the lawyers who 
should have received fees based on their work to the lawyers who had invested in the lawsuit 
"completely distorted the lodestar approach to fee awards." 818 F.2d at 222. The court also 
rejected the idea that the PMC somehow constituted an ad hoc partnership (see note 18 supra): 
"They merely are a group of individual lawyers and law firms associated in the prosecution of a 
single lawsuit, and they lack the ongoing relationship that is the essential element of attorneys 
practicing as partners." 818 F.2d at 226. The court did not, however, entirely forbid fee-sharing 
agreements under different circumstances, and another panel of the Second Circuit has recently 
upheld and enforced such an agreement under significantly different circumstances. See Stissi v. 
Interstate & Ocean Transp., 814 F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1987). 
28. The other rulings of the court of appeals included decisions approving Judge Weinstein's 
plan for distribution of the proceeds of the settlement (except for his plan to use some of the 
money to create a foundation), 818 F.2d 179, affirmance of dismissal of all claims against the 
United States by veterans and their wives or by the Agent Orange manufacturers for indemnity, 
818 F.2d 194; 818 F.2d 201; 818 F.2d 204, and affirmance of Judge Weinstein's fee awards, 818 
F.2d 226; see also 821 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1987) (decision of a different court of appeals panel 
upholding unsealing of discovery materials). 
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"any serious effort to evaluate the Agent Orange case cannot be satis-
fied by a merely descriptive account; it must also confront the norma-
tive question of what that system (at least as applied to mass toxic 
exposures) ought to be" (p. 257; emphasis in original). His goal is that 
the reader will be "buoyed by the encouraging array of reform op-
tions" presented in his concluding chapters (p. viii). 
The basic problem with the analysis that follows is that Professor 
Schuck draws largely upon contemporary criticisms of more ordinary 
tort cases for his explorations of alternatives. The tort system has cer-
tainly come in for a lot of bashing lately. Some of this may be attrib-
uted to self-interested lobbying by insurance and related interests, but 
there are real objections to the system. It doles out compensation in 
inconsistent amounts, leaving many without remedy because they have 
been struck down by natural forces or a penniless actor or because 
they can't identify the person who harmed them. On the other hand, 
leaving matters to lay jurors can impose enormous risks and uncer-
tainty on providers of goods and services. Moreover, tort litigation 
can be very expensive for all and can leave the injured party uncom-
pensated to the extent that his lawyer takes a share, unless one views 
"pain and suffering" awards as a device to cover plaintiffs' attorneys' 
fees.29 Evaluating these objections, which form the focus of numerous 
lengthy symposia,30 is obviously beyond the scope of a book review. 
Nonetheless, Professor Schuck has performed a service by making this 
debate accessible to lay readers. 
Particularly because of the charged atmosphere in which the cur-
rent discussion occurs, however, it is critical to appreciate that the 
Agent Orange saga is not a parable about these deficiencies in the tort 
system. Instead, this litigation presented the extraordinary difficulties 
of both the indeterminate plaintiff and the indeterminate defendant, 
which only the most ambitious courts have taken on.31 To these it 
added several complicating matters. First was the question of whether 
Agent Orange actually causes harm; Professor Schuck contrasts it 
with the "incontrovertible toxicity" of asbestos (p. 33). Beyond this 
was the fact that the concentration of TCDD varied enormously 
29. See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES§ 8.1, at 550 (1973) ("pain and 
suffering damages •.. are simply a means of financing the contingent-fee litigation"). 
30. See, e.g .. Alternative Compensation Schemes and Tort Theory, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 548 
(1985); Critical Issues in Ton Law Reform: A Search for Principles, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 459 
(1985). 
31. Probably the most radical idea thus far has been the market share liability concept in 
Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cerL denied, 449 U.S. 
912 (1980). This decision drew heavily on Judge Weinstein's reasoning in Hall v. E.I. Du Pont 
De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), where he upheld suits against all of the 
manufacturers in the blasting cap industry although the persons injured by blasting caps could 
not identify particular manufacturers as required by enterprise liability theory. According to 
Professor Schuck, none of the parties briefed this theory in Hall; Judge Weinstein worked it up 
himself. P. 112. 
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among manufacturers, and that the different products were mixed to-
gether in Vietnam. Finally, there was no way to determine accurately 
how often an individual veteran had been exposed, or to identify the 
mixture encountered. Given these forbidding obstacles to recovery, it 
is not 'surprising that Professor Schuck tells us that "[a] case like Bho-
pal ... will probably be like child's play compared to Agent Orange" 
(p. 14). Because of these special difficulties, he acknowledges that "it 
would be foolish to redesign the entire tort system solely to deal with 
them" (p. 261). Unfortunately, this message tends to get lost as the 
discussion shifts to evaluating alternatives. 
Because of the book's more general discussion of the continued 
viability of tort litigation, it is also important to offer some cautionary 
observations about the options that Schuck hopes will fill the reader 
with confidence about the promise of reform. 
A. Regulation 
Drawing heavily on Peter Huber,32 Professor Schuck suggests that 
a better way of handling toxics would be through regulation by tech-
nocrats. Huber forcefully argues that the tort system inherently dis-
criminates against new technologies, stressing their risks without 
giving adequate weight to the reduction of risk that results when they 
displace more dangerous technologies. Further, the ex post setting of 
litigation is by definition inferior to an ex ante evaluation of risks ver-
sus benefits by technocrats who can make their decision before the 
new technology is deployed. 
The regulatory alternative seems a doubtful solution, at least in the 
toxic torts area. In the abstract, of course, regulation appears to be a 
wonderful thing. Surely none would prefer expensive efforts to com-
pensate victims after the fact where the harm itself could have been 
prevented by incisive regulatory intervention before the fact. More-
over, as Huber argues, technocrats may be better trained to balance 
risks against benefits than judges and juries. But as Professor Schuck 
recognizes, this enthusiasm must be viewed with skepticism: even 
technocrats may lack the appropriate expertise for this sort of 
calculus. Regarding Agent Orange, for example, how exactly does one 
balance the benefits of the defoliant against the risks of fighting a guer-
rilla war without it? One of the most active veterans, a ground soldier 
in Vietnam, felt during the war that Agent Orange was "great stuff. 
We were fighting in a triple-canopy jungle . . . and I wanted those 
planes to melt the whole thing away so we could see the enemy" (p. 
32. See Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the 
Courts, BS CoLUM. L. REV. 277 (1985). It is worth noting that Judge Weinstein seems to share 
some of Huber's concerns; he has criticized "the threat [from litigation] of post hoc risk assess-
ments that do not advance society's overall needs [which in tum] inhibits socially useful action. 
Inhibiting production of useful vaccines is one example .••• " Weinstein, The Role of the Court 
in Toxic Tort Litigation, 13 GEO. L.J. 1389 (1985). 
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41). The enemy were, indeed, trying to kill American soldiers on the 
spot. Such imponderables provide a strong basis for the Feres doc-
trine. 33 Moreover, it is hard to understand how an expert acting in 
1965 could have discerned the health risks, if any, that would result, 
when causation was the main ambiguity in the litigation. In spite of 
this, once the educated technocratic guess is made, the injured should 
be left without compensation because "regulatory standards concern-
ing the appropriate, socially acceptable level of risk should ordinarily 
be binding on juries in subsequent tort cases. " 34 
More fundamentally, however, regulation raises serious risks of 
underenforcement and overenforcement due to political and related 
pressures. Aggressive plaintiffs' lawyers pursue things that compla-
cent bureaucrats do not. This can be strikingly illustrated, as David 
Rosenberg has pointed out, with the story of the government inspector 
at an asbestos plant who bravely eschewed a protective mask and ex-
posed himself to the dust (which he knew to be harmful) in order to 
assist the manufacturers in concealing the hazards of asbestos from the 
workers. 35 Only the foolish would ignore the risk that a regulatory 
body will become a kept creature of industry.36 At the same time, 
there is equal reason to worry about a regulatory body composed of 
zealots. The manifold frustrations experienced by those who seek to 
33. As the Second Circuit put it in affirming the summary judgment Judge Weinstein granted 
against the opt-outs, Agent Orange's "success as a herbicide saved many, perhaps thousands of, 
lives." 818 F.2d 187, 193 (2d Cir. 1987). 
34. P. 291. Cf City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (court may not enjoin 
activity causing pollution where defendant held permit from Environmental Protection Agency). 
With Agent Orange, of course, the question whether the chemical companies made a full disclo-
sure to the government (raised by the government contractor defense) is the kind of issue that 
might undermine reliance on regulatory permission. Surely the regulated should not be allowed 
simultaneously to deceive the regulators and to invoke the protection of a permit issued by the 
uninformed agency. But to allow litigation of this issue would seem to frustrate the desire to take 
such matters out of the courts. Cf Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (denial of 
immunity from suit immediately appealable because "it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously 
permitted to go to trial"); Marcus, Fraudulent Concealment in Federal Court: Toward a More 
Disparate Standard?, 71 GEO. L.J. 829, 901 (1983) ("If a defendant must defend on the merits 
whenever a plaintiff invokes tolling [under the fraudulent concealment doctrine], the protection 
of the statute of limitations will be substantially undermined."). 
35. See Rosenberg, The Dusting of America: A Story of Asbestos - Carnage, Cover-up, and 
Litigation (Book Review), 99 HARV. L. REV. 1693, 1706 (1986) (citing P. BRODEUR, supra note 
8, at 89). The inspectors also entered into a confidentiality agreement that forbade disclosure of 
the hazards of asbestos to workers. P. BRODEUR, supra note 8, at 89. Some inspectors them-
selves remained in the dark. See id. at 79 ("[A]s the health situation at the Tyler plant went from 
bad to worse to appalling, a parade of government inspectors continued to troop through the 
place without any apparent awareness of the manifest hazards there."). 
36. As just one recent instance of such charges, consider the controversy about Nuclear Reg-
ulatory Commission member Thomas Roberts, a former manufacturer of nuclear reactor compo-
nents, who has been linked to the leaking of internal investigatory documents to a utility and 
charged with improperly favoring the nuclear power industry. See, e.g., Franklin, Nuclear Offi-
cial Pressed to Resign, N.Y. Times, June 10, 1987, at A25, col. 1; Franklin, Nuclear Officials 
Assailed As Biased, N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1987, at 1, col. 5. Perhaps the fact there has been 
controversy shows things can work, but the charges are nevertheless troubling. 
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engage in real property development in areas where there is great en-
thusiasm for regulating land development should cause the proponents 
of regulation to pause. 37 Indeed, Huber himself has recently cata-
logued the failings of regulation of electrical power. 38 Assuming that 
tort litigation overly deters new technologies, is it clear that zealous 
technocrats won't inhibit them more by nipping them in the bud? 
Their ex ante judgments are, after all, just that, and they may be 
wrong. Surely they will be more likely to deny permission to try new 
technologies if the fact that they give permission circumscribes the 
rights of the injured. On top of all this is the prospect, graphically 
illustrated by the contrasting attitudes toward regulation of the Carter 
and Reagan administrations, that shifts in political winds may end up 
inflicting both bad types of regulation alternatively. 
On balance, then, the prospect of substituting regulation for litiga-
tion is not comforting despite the drawbacks of the tort system. 39 
Even Professor Schuck acknowledges that "[u]ntil we have greater 
37. Professor Schuck himself has recently documented the deleterious effects of overregula-
tion in an article about the "informal economy" that exists in Peru. He explains that this eco-
nomic activity (roughly half the economic activity in the country) has come into existence 
without official permits because those are too hard to obtain due to "regulatory overkill" and 
"bureaucratic lethargy and red tape." Schuck & Litan, Regulatory Reform in the Third World: 
The Case of Peru, 4 YALE J. ON REG. SI, 61 (1986). 
38. Huber, Electricity and the Environment: In Search of Regulatory Authority, 100 HARV. 
L. REv. 1002 (1987). 
39. Yet another difficulty is the risk of jurisdictional uncertainty. At present, regulation gen-
erally is limited to a given area. Presumably there will never be a single set of technocrats with 
the expertise (and time) to pass on all new technology, so it will continue to be necessary to split 
up jurisdiction. See Huber, supra note 38, at 1013 (''The heart of the problem is the division of 
authority among several separate agencies, each of which is almost wholly oblivious to the tech-
nological alternatives that lie outside its own particular area of expertise."). This may permit 
producers to escape regulation, or at least shift to more sympathetic regulators, by recharacteriz-
ing their products. A.H. Robins, for example, was able to avoid scrutiny by the Food and Drug 
Administration by claiming that its IUD did not release copper, a property that would have 
made it a "drug." Two other producers with similar products that were scrutinized by the FDA 
spent years in the approval process, and therefore won approval only as the Dalkon Shield was 
being removed from the market. See S. ENGELMAYER & R. WAGMAN, supra note 8, at 23. Of 
course, one could view this delay as something less than a triumph of regulation, but given 
Robins' fate these producers may in retrospect be happy about the way things turned out. 
In addition, it should be noted that the intervention of politics into other toxic exposure 
situations should leave observers ambivalent at best about the prospect of governmentally man-
aged regulation. Thus, as the asbestos problem finally became clear through litigation, promi-
nent legislators including Senator Gary Hart proposed bailout legislation to assist industry. See 
P. BRODEUR, supra note 8, at 141, 194-95, 258-62. Perhaps it is reassuring, however, that this 
legislation did not, we are told, have "a prayer of being enacted by Congress." Id. at 195. 
Finally, where government itself is involved in the alleged misconduct, as with Agent Orange, 
it seems particularly inappropriate to have regulators selected by government passing on the 
conduct. Even under the existing tort system, government may be particularly able to conceal its 
own wrongdoing. See Note, Citizen Trust and Government Cover-up: Refining the Doctrine of 
Fraudulent Concealment, 95 YALE L.J. 1477, 1489-90 (1986) (describing government's suppres-
sion of reports of health hazards of atomic testing in Nevada and Marshall Islands). Hence, it 
may be necessary to suspend the running of the statute of limitations on claims against govern-
ment. See id. at 1486-99; see generally Marcus, supra note 34, at 855-901. In any event, it is 
surely odd to suggest that a government which can't be trusted not to conceal harmful informa-
tion from its citizens should have the power, ex ante, to absolve itself of liability for its acts. 
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reason to be confident of the efficacy of proposed regulatory reforms, 
we are well advised to retain tort law" (p. 288). 
B. Revised Approaches to Compensation 
Alternatively, one might design a better compensation system. 
Professor Schuck first suggests that the model might be workers' com-
pensation, but quickly and properly rejects that. Whether or not one 
views workers' compensation as an employers' plot to take away work-
ers' valuable claims, 40 the Agent Orange experience suggests reasons 
to be skeptical about expanding the idea because, throughout the rele-
vant period, there was such a scheme for veterans' service-related med-
ical problems - the Veterans Administration. That example hardly 
invites imitation. By 1978, the VA was the second largest federal 
agency in terms of number of employees and third in budget (p. 24). 
Although one VA employee spotted possible links between the herbi-
cide and veterans' ailments, the VA reacted initially by forbidding its 
employees to make file entries concerning a relation between Agent 
Orange exposure and illness (p. 24). Throughout this period, the 
agency resisted inquiry into the problem and upgraded its research 
only when veterans' political activity reached President Carter, who 
put pressure on the agency (pp. 77-78). It is hard to shrug off this 
experience as an isolated failure of the VA, particularly for the Viet-
nam veterans. Indeed, Professor Schuck tells us that on returning 
from combat many veterans embarked on "a new war - this one with 
the Veterans Administration" (p. 40). 
This picture becomes more troubling when one considers the re-
cent litigation regarding attorney participation in the VA claims pro-
cess. Under an 1864 statute, lawyers may not be paid more than ten 
dollars to represent claimants before the VA. However reasonable that 
amount may have been during the Civil War, it obviously is insuffi-
cient now to prompt a competent attorney to take a case, particularly 
a difficult one. Several veterans, who claimed that they had contracted 
cancer due to exposure to radiation in the service and that without the 
help of a lawyer they could not gather evidence and present their com-
plex claims effectively, challenged the limitation as a violation of due 
process. Plaintiffs also claimed that VA employees randomly denied 
claims in order to achieve high performance ratings, compounding the 
problem created by denial of representation. Although the Supreme 
Court overturned a blanket preliminary injunction against the fee limi-
tation on the ground that most claims are not so complex as to make 
denial of a lawyer a denial of due process,41 it left open the question of 
whether these claimants had a right to exemption from the limitation. 
40. See P. BRODEUR, supra note 8, at 16-17, 127-28. 
41. Walters v. National Assn. of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985). 
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Thereafter, the district court found that VA officials had destroyed evi-
dence concerning random denials and embarked on a pattern of non-
compliance with discovery requests, warranting sanctions against the 
VA and appointment of a special master to enforce discovery.42 These 
developments, in tum, have rekindled legislative efforts to repeal the 
ten dollar Iimitation.43 
This episode does not, of course, prove that no responsive claims-
processing alternative to the current tort system could be created. But 
too often those programs must be managed by people who may not 
energetically pursue claims, particularly innovative ones. This pros-
pect should give the reformers pause, particularly in the kind of ex-
traordinarily complex cases that concern Professor Schuck. To the 
extent one introduces lawyers and judicial review into that system, 
however, one may recreate the kinds of problems that cause many to 
urge abandonment of the existing tort system. 
Realizing many of the disadvantages of the workers' compensation 
model, Professor Schuck moves on to adaptations of an idea he finds 
more promising, although to date none of these adaptations has been 
tried anywhere. Specifically, he refers to proposals from Professor 
O'Connell and Dean Calabresi44 to create a system of incentives to-
ward settlement to alleviate what they conceive to be defects in the 
present tort system (pp. 282-86). These new ideas, which can hardly 
be evaluated here in any detail, nevertheless provoke further cautions. 
They betray a strong antipathy toward plaintiffs' lawyers - the very 
people Professor Schuck spends most of his book describing - as 
predators who take from plaintiffs and defendants to the benefit of 
nobody. But the asbestos and Dalkon Shield books, tracts though 
they may be, persuasively demonstrate that formal discovery and in-
formal investigation by plaintiffs' lawyers can be crucial to relief for 
plaintiffs. Professor Schuck may contrast the "incontrovertible toxic-
ity" of asbestos with the ambiguity surrounding the question of harm 
from Agent Orange, but he fails to mention that the asbestos produc-
42. See National Assn. of Radiation Survivors v. Turnage, 115 F.R.D. 543, 551-54 (N.D. 
Cal. 1987). For a more general examination of charges against the VA, see Coyle, The Veterans 
Administration Under Fire, Natl. L.J., June 15, 1987, at 1, col. 2. 
43. See Franklin, Ruling in V.A. Suit Spurs Effort to Let Veterans Hire Lawyers, N.Y. Times, 
Jan. 15, 1987, at A17, col. 2. 
44. O'Connell, Offers That Can't Be Refused: Foreclosure of Personal Injury Claims by De-
fendants' Prompt Tender of Claimants' Net Economic Losses, 77 Nw. U. L. REV. 589 (1983); 
Letter from Guido Calabresi to Blair Bolles (June 14, 1985), reprinted in G. CALABRESI & G. 
PRIEST, COMMENTARY ON THE DODD AND GORTON AMENDMENTS TO S.100 (THE KASTEN 
BILL) 3 (Yale Law School Program in Civil Liability Working Paper No. 34, 1985). The Cala-
bresi paper, on which Professor Schuck seems to pin such hopes, is merely a three-page letter 
from Dean Calabresi to a consultant at Colt Industries describing conversations the Dean had 
with Senators Danforth, Dodd, and Gorton, seemingly in lieu of testimony on the bill. However 
provocative the ideas presented, this is an exceedingly thin reed on which to pin major hopes for 
change. Professor Schuck's acknowledgment that these are the "bare outlines" of a reform ap-
proach, p. 285, is not a fair disclosure of the true nature of the letter he describes. 
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ers regularly controverted its danger, and apparently concealed it. 
This story was pieced together by plaintiffs' lawyers over years of liti-
gation, 45 although Schuck complains that this process took too long 
(p. 289). Similarly, plaintiffs' lawyers played an important role in de-
veloping proof of the harmful effects of the Dalkon Shield, 46 so it 
seems simply wrong to conclude that they are mere parasites on the 
system. These new proposals don't appear to offer a substitute for 
them. It is true that the plaintiffs' lawyers seem to have unearthed 
little about Agent Orange and Professor Schuck pays scant attention 
to the material they obtained through discovery, although we are told 
of at least one hot document that plaintiffs' counsel obtained (p. 85). 
But the fact that they did not unearth more hot documents may show 
that they lacked sufficient funds to do so, or that there are no such 
documents. 
Similarly ambiguous is the pervasive emphasis on cost of litigation. 
In the asbestos cases, many have harped on the Rand study showing 
that of the entire amount the defendants spent on litigation only 
thirty-seven percent actually went to claimants. 47 Startling as that sta-
tistic seems in the abstract, it actually provides scant basis for evaluat-
ing the system absent a reliable study of costs of alternative systems.48 
Moreover, the costs may be attributed in large measure to rigid de-
fense posturing in asbestos litigation. There is some suggestion of such 
behavior in Agent Orange. Thus, Professor Schuck says that the 
chemical companies sought to add the United States to the litigation 
"to reap strategic advantage ... [because] it would surely bog the case 
down in years of discovery" (pp. 60-61). More ominously, he tells us 
that when Judge Pratt vacated his stay on discovery the parties 
couldn't agree at all about how it should be handled.49 Again, the 
Dalkon Shield litigation provides further confirmation. There, a judge 
eventually found that defendant's stonewalling in discovery had be-
come so pervasive that it warranted abrogation of the attorney-client 
privilege under the crime or fraud exception to that privilege. 50 In 
45. See P. BRODEUR, supra note 8, at 97-131. 
46. Sees. ENGELMAYER & R. WAGMAN, supra note 8, at 194-227. 
47. J. KAKALIK, P. EBENER, W. FELSfINER & M. SHANLEY, COSTS OF AsBESTOS LmGA-
TION tab. S.2, at vii (Rand Corporation Institute for Civil Justice, 1983). 
48. Elliott, Goal Analysis Versus Institutional Analysis of Toxic Compensation Systems, 73 
GEO. L.J. 1357, 1373 (1985). 
49. P. 70. For a recent example of such hard-nosed lawyering by Dow Chemical Company, 
a leading defendant in Agent Orange, see Grenier v. Dow Chern. Co., 624 F. Supp. 1207 (D. Me. 
1986), a products liability action in which Dow sought to introduce plaintiff's thirty-four-year-
old conviction for breaking and entering despite the provision of Federal Rule of Evidence 
609(b ). Rule 609(b) precludes admission of evidence of prior convictions that are more than ten 
years old unless the probative value of the conviction regarding credibility "substantially out-
weighs" its prejudicial effect, surely hard to imagine with a conviction for breaking and entering. 
In Grenier. Dow was represented by Leonard Rivkin, the same lawyer who represented Dow in 
the Agent Orange litigation. 
50. In re A.H. Robins Co., 107 F.R.D. 2 (D. Kan. 1985). 
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short, litigation cost is a two-way street. 
On balance, then, Professor Schuck's alternatives seem doubtful 
substitutes for what we now have, at least in the kinds of cases he says 
he is discussing. His book does not show that tort litigation has 
reached an apocalyptic impasse, although the collective uncertainties 
in the Agent Orange litigation itself raise important concerns about 
how such cases should be handled. 
III. PROCEDURAL APOCALYPSE? 
The beauty of the classical tragedy as an art form lies in the element 
of catharsis - the purgation of tension that comes with the spectator's 
epiphany that he too possesses the flaws that have been responsible for 
the tragic hero's downfall, but that he may avoid such a fall because he 
understands the moral of the drama. The moral of the asbestos drama is 
that without the willingness to adopt new procedures to alleviate 
problems caused by significant changes in society and the substantive 
case law, those problems will persist and multiply. 
- Judge Robert Parkers• 
Federal district judges are increasingly willing to experiment with 
procedures in challenging cases, particularly mass tort cases. Profes-
sor Schuck's book provides a detailed picture of such an experiment. 
The insights are troubling, if not apocalyptic. 
A. Mass Tort Class Actions 
Initially, the idea for an Agent Orange class action came not from 
a lawyer but as a deathbed wish of Paul Reutershan, the veteran 
whose lawsuit got the Agent Orange litigation undenvay (p. 43). In 
this, he expressed a seemingly widespread public view that class ac-
tions are wonderful devices for vindicating the rights of many. Adapt-
ing Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to toxic torts is a 
formidable task, however, and one may legitimately question Judge 
Weinstein's eventual conclusion that the class action approach would 
fit better in Agent Orange than in litigation growing out of asbestos, 
DES, or the Dalkon Shield (where class action treatment had been 
rejected).52 Judge Pratt had premised his initial authorization for class 
action treatment more on the impossibility of individual litigation than 
on the affirmative attractiveness of the class action approach (p. 68). 
But there is at least some reason to suspect that, had class treatment 
51. Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 109 F.R.D. 269, 283 (E.D. Tex. 1985), ajfd., 782 F.2d 468 
(5th Cir. 1986) (certifying asbestosis class action). 
52. See 100 F.R.D. 718, 723 (E.D.N.Y. 1983): 
Unlike the asbestos, DES, Dalkon Shield, and Federal Skywa/k cases, defendants contest 
liability not just as to individual members of the class, but as to any members of the class. 
Thus, unlike other mass product liability cases, a determination of general causation will 
serve both the interests of judicial economy and assist in the speedy and less expensive reso-
lution of individual class member's claims. 
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not been approved, individual actions would have proceeded, as they 
did in the asbestos, DES, and Dalkon Shield litigation. If so, it might 
have been preferable to let them run their course. 
The stimulus behind Judge Weinstein's ultimate endorsement of 
the class action seems to have been more a substantive preference than 
a procedural determination. He hoped that the class action could be 
used to ease problems of causation in toxic exposure cases where no 
individual plaintiff may be able to establish that his cancer or other 
harm was caused by exposure although, taken as a mass, the number 
of cancers in a given population has increased due to exposure. Pro-
fessor David Rosenberg has urged that the class action could, in such 
situations, bridge the gap between individual causation and creation of 
an "excess risk" of cancer and thereby afford some compensation. 53 
As Professor Schuck argues, however, applying this theory in concrete 
cases is highly problematical, and Agent Orange seems not to have 
afforded a vehicle for testing it because the proof of excess risk ulti-
mately did not materialize. 54 
Putting this substantive objective aside, the book provides valid 
reasons for caution in generally using class actions in mass tort cases. 
One is the extent to which the lawyer controls the lawsuit without any 
effective control by, or even consultation with, the "client." There is 
often an unavoidable conflict of interest between class counsel, who 
risk nonpayment in the event of defeat, and class members, who may 
53. Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A ''Public Law" Vision of 
the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REv. 851 (1984). This general approach was proposed over 25 
years ago by Professor Estep. See Estep, Radiation Injuries and Statistics: The Need for a New 
Approach to Injury Litigation, 59 MICH. L. REv. 259, 281-98 (1960). The utility of a class-wide 
approach is not limited to toxic exposure cases, however. In an employment discrimination case, 
for example, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that when the impact of discriminatory practices on 
individual employees is difficult to trace "a class-wide approach to the measure of back pay is 
necessitated [because] ... exact reconstruction of each individual claimant's work history, as if 
discrimination had not occurred, is not only imprecise but impractical." Pettway v. American 
Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 261-62 (5th Cir. 1974) (footnotes omitted). 
54. Thus, Judge Weinstein later reconciled the class settlement with the summary judgment 
granted to defendants in the opt-out cases on the ground that studies became available after the 
class action was settled which showed that there was no population-wide increase in disease 
among those exposed compared with those not exposed: 
The class action was settled before most of these studies were publicly available, so the 
settlement was based on that information. At that time it was my assumption, and I think 
the assumption of the plaintiffs certainly, that there would be certain spikes - that is, those 
who were involved with Agent Orange would have had a higher degree of leukemia or soft 
tissue sarcomas than the population as a whole or the non-Agent-Orange population that 
went into Vietnam. On the basis of that assumption, I devised ... [the theory that] if you're 
dealing with a large group you could make the defendants pay for that proportion caused by 
them as a whole. . • . [Y]ou can deal with it if you have those spikes. Because if everything 
is level, then you're exactly no place. 
J. Weinstein, Remarks to the Section of Evidence, American Association of Law Schools (Jan. 5, 
1986) (cassette 45, available at the University of Illinois Law Library); see also Tests of 444 
Vietnam Veterans Find Average Dioxin Levels, N.Y. Times, July 25, 1987, at 8, col. 1 (natl. ed) 
(Vietnam veterans found to have dioxin levels no higher than people who did not serve in 
Vietnam). 
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prefer to reject a substantial settlement in favor of the promise of a 
more substantial recovery at trial. Since many of the class lawyers in 
Agent Orange had made "perhaps the largest investment of their pro-
fessional lives" (p. 50), there was singular pressure here. At the same 
time, the gradual shift of control from Y annacone to the members of 
the PMC meant that the lawyers with this stake in settlement had only 
attenuated contact - and virtually no rapport - with the veterans. 
Not surprisingly, many veterans believed the PMC sold them out in 
accepting the settlement. 
Other facts, however, show that concern about lawyers' disregard 
for the interests of the class is not a compelling reason for mistrusting 
the Agent Orange class action. Although Judge Weinstein viewed the 
representative plaintiffs as "only names" (p. 193), it is clear that class 
counsel were quite concerned about the veterans' reaction to any set-
tlement (p. 153). More significantly, like Reutershan, many veterans 
had unrealistic expectations about what could be accomplished by liti-
gation. As Professor Schuck puts it, they viewed the case as "a searing 
morality play projected onto a national stage" (p. 11). No doubt many 
shared the view of the veteran who said, "I don't want this case to be 
inconclusive like the war was" (p. 215). They also hoped that the liti-
gation would be a watershed, signalling that the Vietnam veteran had 
finally been accepted back into the mainstream of American life. If 
the class action was a useful vehicle to obtain judicial relief, it is unfair 
to carp because the case failed to achieve socio-political ends as well. 
Standing alone, this aspect of the Agent Orange story is not too 
unnerving. 
More troubling questions arise about the legal performance of class 
counsel in Agent Orange, however. Inside glimpses of the workings of 
class counsel are rare, but can be striking. In re Fine Paper Antitrust 
Litigation 55 graphically illustrates the problems that disagreements 
among plaintiffs' lawyers can cause. There are some intimations of 
competitiveness in Agent Orange as well. Thus, Y annacone & Associ-
ates were preoccupied with the threat that the Texas group would 
"take over" their lawsuit (pp. 50-51, 74-76). Similarly, right up to the 
minute of settlement there was substantial division among the PMC 
lawyers about whether to settle or go to trial. These divisions were 
compounded by the participation of the "investor" lawyers, whose 
control of the purse-strings gave them more power than, and a differ-
ent perspective from, the lawyers who were preparing to try the case. 
Coupled with the distance between the PMC lawyers and their "cli-
ents," these aspects of the Agent Orange story provide good reason for 
55. 98 F.R.D. 48 (E.D. Pa. 1983), ajfd. in part, revd. in part, 751 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1984). In 
this price-fixing litigation, tension between the co-lead counsel for the plaintiff class was charac· 
terized as "nothing more than an out-and-out power struggle that began with name calling and 
ended with the establishment of separate camps (rival trial headquarters) in Philadelphia in an· 
ticipation of the trial." 98 F.R.D. at 146 (footnote omitted). 
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caution in certifying mass tort class actions or, at least, for promoting 
efforts to reduce such structural failings in class actions that are 
certified. 
More basic yet is genuine concern about whether class counsel did 
even a minimally adequate job of preparing for trial. The magnitude 
of the Agent Orange case forced the plaintiff lawyers to organize 
themselves into what has been labeled an ad hoc law firm. 56 Professor 
Schuck's description hardly fills the observer with confidence about 
effective partnership of entrepreneurial plaintiffs' lawyers. Whatever 
the reason, it is surely troubling to learn that the chemical companies 
initiated virtually all the discovery, while Yannacone & Associates 
sometimes lacked sufficient resources even to buy copies of the mate-
rial they had discovered (p. 92). The consortium's management con-
sultant described it as "an accident waiting to happen" (p. 73), and 
three months before the initial trial date one consortium member 
warned his colleagues that they faced not only the risk of being dis-
charged as class counsel but also a "clear danger of being the recipi-
ents of some rather nasty malpractice actions" (p. 95). Similarly 
unsettling is the fact that during the hectic weekend settlement negoti-
ations the PMC lawyers still had no accurate idea how many claims 
there were (p. 161). 
In theory, the court is to scrutinize class counsel carefully before 
approving their appointment and to monitor the adequacy of their per-
formance after they are approved. Indeed, the court is directed to 
decertify the class even after the trial if that performance is inade-
quate. The Agent Orange experience leaves open the question whether 
such oversight can work. We are told that "[Judge] Pratt's continuing 
ignorance concerning the internecine strife within the plaintiffs' camp 
was an important lever in Yannacone's struggle with his legal associ-
ates" (p. 53), because they feared if they pushed him too far he would 
56. Judge Weinstein so recognized. See 611 F. Supp. 1452, 1458 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) ("The 
PMC may be considered an ad hoc law firm, a joint venture formed for the purpose of prosecut-
ing the Agent Orange multidistrict litigation."). For analysis of the theory underlying such ar-
rangements, see Coffee, supra note 18, at 57-69; Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: 
The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Deriva-
tive Actions, 86 CoLUM. L. REv. 669, 704-12 (1986). Although the Second Circuit eventually 
rejected the idea that the arrangement among plaintiffs' counsel in the Agent Orange litigation 
constituted an ad hoc law firm, see note 27 supra, it should be noted that the idea has some 
currency in practice. Thus, a recent article on litigator Stephen Susman of Texas reported that 
he relied in part on "a blossoming expertise in a rare organizational specialty - management of 
'ad hoc' law firms for effective pursuit of complex cases." Taylor, No Apologies Made for the 
Profit Motive, Natl. L.J., Mar. 30, 1987, at l, col. 1, 27, col. 2. 
Financing was not the only way in which the Agent Orange arrangement differed from the 
more traditional law firms representing defendants. "Led by the colorful, headline-grabbing 
Yannacone, they waged their war against Agent Orange outside the courtroom as well as within 
it," while defense counsel shunned the media. P. 72. Furthermore, as one of the plaintiffs' law-
yers noted, "[t]heir paper work was superb; we sometimes filed our briefs without staples, cutting 
and pasting on our way to the courthouse. The Wall Street boys would file errata sheets cor-
recting an incorrect page cite; we made so many errors we didn't bother." P. 73. 
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"blow the whistle" to the judge. But without such defections, as in 
Fine Paper, 57 it is difficult to understand how the judge is to perform 
his oversight duties. Given the structural difficulties presented by try-
ing to mold a group of personal injury lawyers into a mock-up of a law 
firm, these concerns are particularly acute in massive personal injury 
litigation like Agent Orange. 
It may be that coordinated but independent efforts by plaintiffs' 
lawyers handling individual cases actually provide better assurance of 
thorough preparation. Information sharing among plaintiffs' lawyers 
has become a widespread feature of the contemporary litigation land-
scape. 58 Both the asbestos and Dalkon Shield experiences~show that it 
can work. Although the first asbestos and Dalkon Shield suits were 
not successful, plaintiffs' counsel doggedly continued to pursue discov-
ery and investigation, pooling the fruit of early litigation in a com-
bined effort to vanquish the defendant. There is some empirical 
evidence to support the proposition that contingency-fee lawyers will 
invest more effort than hourly-fee lawyers Oike class counsel, who are 
usually paid on a hourly basis via court-awarded fees). 59 Hence, these 
experiences with other mass torts may provide further reason for 
shunning the class action model in such actions, but it would be a 
mistake to make too much of the comparison. The challenges con-
fronting plaintiffs' counsel in Agent Orange may have been of such a 
different order that the case is not analogous. Moreover, Yannacone's 
initial consortium was replaced by the PMC, which seems to have 
done a better job. The Agent Orange story actually shows that other 
forces, mainly financial, may cause underprepared class counsel to en-
list support even though the judge cannot effectively evaluate their 
pre-trial performance. Nonetheless, Professor Schuck's book raises 
very serious questions about efforts to mold the class action device to 
fit mass torts, particularly mass exposure cases. 60 
57. In In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 98 F.R.D. 48 (E.D. Pa. 1983), ajfd. in part, revd. in 
part, 151F.2d562 (3d Cir. 1984), plaintiffs' lead counsel Harold Kohn broke ranks and attacked 
the handling of the case by his co-lead counsel, Granville Specks. See Bruck, Harold Kohn 
Against the World, AM. LAW., Jan. 1982, at 28. 
58. See Kirsch, Evidence Sharing, CAL. LAW., June 1985, at 19. This sort of sharing has 
been going on for over twenty years. See Rheingold, The MER/29 Story - An Instance of 
Successful Mass Disaster Litigation, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 116, 122 (1968) (describing meeting of 
plaintiffs' lawyers at ATLA meeting in 1963 to discuss coordinated strategy in litigation relating 
to anti-cholesterol drug MER/29). In both the asbestos and Dalkon Shield litigations, such 
sharing was common, although it was sometimes impeded by court-imposed confidentiality or-
ders. See P. BRODEUR, supra note 8, at 92; see generally Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective 
Order Litigation, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 41-46 (1983) (discussing modification of confidentiality 
orders to allow use of evidence in other litigation). 
59. See Kritzer, Felstiner, Sarat & Trubek, The Impact of Fee Arrangement on Lawyer Effort, 
19 L. & SocY. REV. 251, 267 (1985). 
60. This is certainly the reaction of the Second Circuit, which concluded that "[t]he present 
litigation justifies the prevalent skepticism over the usefulness of class actions in so-called mass 
tort cases and, in particular, claims for injuries resulting from toxic exposure." 818 F.2d 145, 
164 (2d Cir. 1987). 
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Lest the picture seem too gloomy, however, it is important to men-
tion seemingly contrary experiences. For example, in March and 
April 1985, an outbreak of salmonella in six midwestem states, result-
ing in what a committee of the Illinois Legislature called the largest 
mass food poisoning in United States history, 61 was traced to tainted 
milk. Nearly 17,000 culture confirmations were eventually identified. 
Needless to say, litigation resulted. In a series of innovative moves, a 
class action for compensatory and punitive damages was certified by 
the Illinois state courts;62 all cases pending in the Illinois state court 
system were consolidated for pre-trial discovery before one circuit 
court, 63 and a federal court entertaining a parallel class action stayed 
its proceedings in deference to the state court litigation. 64 After sub-
stantial discovery, the case went to trial in November 1986, a year-
and-a-half after the incidents. Defendant Jewel Companies then stipu-
lated to liability for compensatory damages to the certified classes. 65 
The case was tried for ten weeks on punitive damages, and the jury 
eventually found there was no justification for a punitive award. 66 
Since then, the parties have reached a preliminary agreement about a 
claims procedure for compensatory claims. 67 Certainly this example 
shows promise for the future. 
B. Managerial Judging 
Spurred by the 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, federal judges have become increasingly assertive in con-
trolling litigation before them. These developments have, in tum, 
sparked a firestorm of debate about the proper functioning of judges 
that rivals the current preoccupation with the tort system. But the 
61. ILLINOIS HOUSE STATE GOVT. ADMIN. AND REGULATORY REVIEW COMM., REPORT 
ON THE 1985 ILLINOIS SALMONELLA EPIDEMIC 1(June26, 1985). 
62. In re Salmonella Litig., No. 85 L 000000 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Aug. 1, 1985) (memorandum 
opinion and order certifying class action). 
63. In re Salmonella Litig., No. 61974 (Ill. Sup. Ct. June 27, 1985) (order granting consoli-
dation for pre-trial discovery); In re Salmonella Litig., No. 63629 (Ill. Sup. Ct. June 30, 1986) 
(order directing consolidated discovery); In re Salmonella Litig., No. 61974 (Ill. Sup. Ct. Sept. 
22, 1986) (order directing consolidated discovery). 
64. See Schomber v. Jewel Cos., 614 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Ill. 1985). 
65. In re Salmonella Litig., No. 85 L 000000 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Nov. 3, 1986) (stipulation regard-
ing compensatory liability). 
66. See Jury Rules Stores Not Negligent in Poisoning, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1987, at 8, col. 3 
(natl. ed.). 
67. Counsel for the plaintiff class and defendant Jewel negotiated an agreement, preliminarily 
approved by the court, to establish a Salmonella Personal Injury Claims Facility. The court 
directed that notice of the proposed settlement and a claim form be sent by mail to all persons 
known by counsel to be in the class, and that notice also be published in a number of newspapers 
and announced on television and radio. In re Salmonella Litig., No. 85 L 000000 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 
Apr. 30, 1987) (order preliminarily approving claims facility and class notification procedures). 
The claims facility, to be administered by a retired circuit judge, was expected to resolve in excess 
of 20,000 claims for personal injury and medical expenses. Chief Judge Harry G. Comerford, 
Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, Press Release (Apr. 30, 1987). 
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debate has often been carried on at a rather abstract level. 68 The 
Agent Orange story provides an opportunity to examine these issues in 
a concrete setting. The results are discomfiting. 
The starting point is the administration of Judge Pratt, who pre-
sided over the case from 1979 to October 1983. Professor Schuck de-
picts him as "a fairly conservative, conventional, workmanlike judge" 
(p. 111 ). He relays the views of the lawyers that the judge was "simply 
paralyzed by the magnitude and complexity of the case" (p. 80), and 
therefore ran the case like an "absentee landlord" (p. 117). As a result 
the case meandered, a situation that all seem to have deplored: 
"[W]e'd still be in discovery if Weinstein had not taken the case over" 
(p. 198). Here, at least, it appears that the traditional judicial action 
didn't work. 69 
As Professor Schuck describes him, Judge Weinstein could hardly 
have been more different, and the enduring question is whether his 
remarkable handling of the case should be preferred to Judge Pratt's 
more conventional attitude. Indeed, there is something of a love/hate 
dichotomy in Schuck's attitude toward Weinstein. One image of 
Weinstein is of the "judicial wizard" (p. 128) with a "towering reputa-
tion" (p. 111), "vast imagination ... and almost blinding brilliance" 
(p. 112). Thus, the judge's initial meeting with the lawyers when he 
took the case over is twice described as "dazzling" (pp. 112, 117), and 
we are regaled about the "true artistry" and "sublime skill" (p. 132) 
with which Weinstein applied his "fertile, analytically powerful mind" 
(p. 186) to the problems of the case. But Professor Schuck sees a 
darker side to these talents. We are also informed that the "wily 
judge" (p. 137) could "work both sides of the street" (p. 131), that he 
combined "prestidigitation" with "rank insubordination" (p. 130) in 
68. Thus the leading critical article, Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 376 
(1982), has been criticized as relying on two imaginary lawsuits rather than real life cases. See 
Flanders, Blind Umpires -A Response to Professor Resnik, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 505, 508 (1984), 
Gradually, we are getting information about concrete cases. See McGovern, Toward a Func-
tional Approach for Managing Complex Litigation, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 440, 441-42 (1986) ("With 
a sufficient database of case histories, it may be possible by reasoning inductively to develop a 
functional approach for the judicial management of complex cases."). At present, however, one 
must also agree with Professor Schuck's assessment that "one who would study this issue has 
little choice of data; the Agent Orange case is perhaps the only complex litigation whose settle-
ment has been the subject of a detailed academic case study. Until more is known about other 
such cases, Agent Orange's typicality must remain an open question." Schuck, The Role of the 
Judge in Settling Complex Cases: TheAgent Orange Example, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 337, 340 n.15 
(1986). 
69. Lest it appear that Judge Pratt took a hidebound approach to the case, it must be empha· 
sized that he did not. To the contrary, Professor Schuck acknowledges that he handled several 
problems innovatively. See, e.g., p. 93 (Pratt resolved the problem of governmental privilege "in 
an innovative fashion"). More significantly, Schuck recognizes that Judge Pratt's class certifica-
tion opinion "undermines the notion, widely shared by the Agent Orange lawyers, that Pratt 
viewed the case as a conventional tort dispute." P. 68. In all of that, Pratt was in the main-
stream of the evolving judicial management movement. The point here is that, compared to 
Judge Weinstein, he did take a cautious and traditional approach. 
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his handling of legal issues, and that he manipulated the law in ways 
that would keep the parties off balance. He even, we are told, em-
ployed Socratic probing of a government lawyer to bully her into what 
he later treated as a concession critical to denying the government 
Feres protection against claims of civilian plaintiffs although the gov-
ernment "had conceded no such thing" (p. 134). 
We need not try to reconcile these disparate images of Judge Wein-
stein. There is no doubt that he is rightly regarded as one of the most 
capable, if not the most outstanding, district judge in the nation. 70 So 
great are his powers that "[w]hen Weinstein was on the bench, the 
lawyers often seemed superfluous. Instead of being the target of the 
lawyer's wiles and manipulations, as most judges were, he was more 
often the master of those tactics, confounding lawyers and, when nec-
essary, making up the rules as he went along" (p. 112). The question 
is whether, particularly in the hands of such a talented judge, the new 
managerial trend gives too much power to one official. As a lesson in 
the apocalypse of the litigation system, Agent Orange has some disqui-
eting aspects. 
Certainly the judge did a masterful job of seizing the initiative and 
promoting settlement. He effectively deployed his special masters as a 
settlement squad. They, in turn, took the ball and ran with it. Indeed, 
the around-the-clock weekend of negotiations that led to settlement 
was the brainchild of one of the masters, not the judge, and he ordered 
the lawyers to report to the courthouse before he cleared the idea with 
the judge (p. 150). During the hectic weekend, the initiative belonged 
entirely to the judge and his minions; when the plaintiffs' lawyers 
made an eleventh-hour attempt to discuss a separate settlement with 
some of the defendants, they were rebuffed by defendants, who insisted 
that all negotiations go through the court (p. 164). Moreover, the 
judge very effectively pressured the PMC members at the critical mo-
ment. Some of the plaintiffs' lawyers claimed that they understood 
him to say he would grant a directed verdict to defendants and hold 
the PMC lawyers personally responsible for rejecting the $180 million 
settlement, prospects that left at least one lawyer shaken (pp. 160-63). 
It may be fair to say, as Professor Schuck does, that the judge "played 
a massive game of chicken" (p. 259) and it is clear that he "sired" the 
settlement (p. 166). In terms of process values, these tactics, taken in 
the aggregate, raise serious questions about the propriety of judicial 
activism in promoting settlement. In sum, "Weinstein had fused in 
himself legislative, administrative, and judicial powers, subject to no 
70. Thus, in affirming Judge Weinstein's handling of the class action, the Second Circuit paid 
heed to his "creative approach," which the court found "bold and imaginative," and also referred 
to "the intellectual power of Chief Judge Weinstein's analysis." 818 F.2d 145, 165-67 (2d Cir. 
1987). 
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checks and balances and no higher authority than his own conscience 
and the unlikely intervention of the appellate court" (p. 223). 
Although Professor Schuck exposes these process issues, he does 
not pursue the most intriguing line: Far from acting as a mere 
facilitator of settlement negotiations, the judge imposed his own pre-
ferred settlement on the parties. This fact became graphically clear as 
evening was falling on the Sunday before trial was to begin. By that 
time, the PMC had dropped its demand to $200 million. While meet-
ing with defense counsel, Special Master Shapiro, who was acting as 
point man in the shuttle diplomacy, concluded that "the defendants, 
facing the specter of trial the very next day, could easily be convinced 
that $200 million would be a cheap settlement" (p. 158). As a negotia-
tor, then, he felt he had settlement in his grasp, but he soon found that 
"[t]he real obstacle to a $200 million settlement ... was ... Judge 
Weinstein. Shapiro had tried to convince Weinstein that the defen-
dants could be pushed up to $200 million, but the judge adamantly 
refused. . . . All things considered, he insisted, $180 million plus inter-
est was the fair amount" (p. 159). Thus, when defense counsel pro-
posed increasing their offer, Shapiro surprised them by telling them 
not to move because, if they did, the PMC would never come down 
below $200 million (p. 160). Tactically, of course, he was right; given 
the judge's goal of $180 million, this was a necessary position. The 
intriguing problem is to evaluate the judge's selection of this settle-
ment figure. Was it right or wrong? 
Professor Schuck tells us that he does not know where the $180 
million figure came from, but the judge "almost certainly had it firmly 
in mind well before the weekend negotiations began" (p. 159). He 
may, indeed, have discussed it with one of the special masters over a 
month before. Since Schuck apparently never talked to the judge, 71 
we do not have the judge's reasoning for selecting this particular fig-
ure. We are told, however, that when Special Master Shapiro tried to 
persuade him to press for a $200 million settlement, the judge ex-
plained that because the veterans' case was shaky he had an obligation 
to the legal system not to encourage groundless mass toxic tort litiga-
tion in the future by allowing a settlement that would signal that the 
case was stronger than it was. During the negotiations, neither side 
knew of the judge's private agenda, and when Shapiro later revealed it 
to Dow's lawyer he responded that "[t]he man's too much of an ideal-
ist" (p. 159). Shortly after the settlement was announced, the defen-
dants were quoted as believing the settlement was a bargain, even" '10 
cents on the dollar.' " 72 Particularly given defendants' willingness to 
71. His list of interviewees includes Judge Pratt but not Judge Weinstein. See pp. 301·02. 
We are told that one person agreed to be interviewed on condition the entire interview be kept 
confidential, p. 301, but there is no reason to believe this person was Judge Weinstein. 
72. Press, supra note 6, at 56. 
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pay more, the central enigma of the book is assessing the judge's settle-
ment figure. 
Is this judging? It is far from the classical view of the judge as 
inactive figure who decides according to announced rules of law. Yet 
that vision has long since given way to a more flexible view of the 
judicial function; promoting settlement is now an accepted part of the 
picture. It is surely troubling to picture judges as unprincipled settle-
ment promoters who only care about achieving settlement, and not 
about the terms, particularly when they are armed with the variety of 
persuasive tools Judge Weinstein employed in the Agent Orange litiga-
tion. Better, perhaps, that they should be idealists whose settlement 
posture is informed by a vision of what is right. Indeed, that may 
make them superior in the settlement arena as well. 
The Agent Orange case illustrates this point. A primary impedi-
ment to settlement, from the defendants' perspective, was allocation of 
any global settlement figure among defendants. Despite long efforts to 
resolve the problem among themselves, the defendants failed. The 
defendants' solution? "Let's let the judge do it; he's fair" (p. 156). 
And so he devised a formula that "brought squeals of pain and shrieks 
of delight from the lawyers" (p. 156), but which even the unhappy 
accepted. Similarly, when the ability of one of the small defendants to 
pay threatened to derail the settlement later, the judge was again re-
cruited to decide the issue (p. 164). In each instance, "the settlement 
hinged on the lawyers' perception that Weinstein was scrupulously fair 
and their willingness to be guided by his decision when internal negoti-
ations reached an impasse" (p. 164). An unscrupulous pursuer of a 
deal, any deal, would probably not be able to perform this function. 
But is this judging? What standards did Judge Weinstein use in 
fashioning the critical allocation formula? Were they "legal"?73 In a 
sense, these episodes suggest a model of judging that depends more on 
the personality of the judge than on his position in the institutional 
hierarchy. Judge Weinstein could do it but Judge Pratt, perhaps, 
could not. It is nice to have charismatic judges, but this is hardly a 
trend to be embraced; as Max Weber observed long ago, in a complex 
society it is necessary to shift authority from a charismatic to an insti-
tutionalized leadership. 74 Of all governmental officials, this should be 
73. As Professor Subrin has recently put it, "[a] goal of mediation and conciliation, and 
perhaps to a lesser extent case management, is to avoid judicial application of the law, or at least 
formal application of the law." Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 988 (1987). He la-
ments that "[t]o the extent that advocates of case management, settlement, or alternative dispute 
resolution give up on law application, they are giving up on the essence of adjudication. Ironi-
cally, their attempt to remedy the flaws in judicial dispute resolution rejects the major function 
that courts perform." Id. at 989. 
74. See generally M. WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND EcONOMIC ORGANIZATION 
329-60 (M. Rheinstein ed. 1954) (describing shift of authority from "charismatic" to bureau-
cratic or traditional figures). Much as primitive man may need a charismatic leader to impose 
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most true of judges, and our system therefore resolutely opposes judge 
shopping while permitting forum shopping. 75 Although Agent Or-
ange thus affords an intriguing glimpse into the "brave new world" of 
judging, the judge's resolution of defendants' internal disputes is insti-
tutionally troubling. 
The judge's settlement figure, however, is more problematical. At 
least the defense lawyers submitted their internal disputes to the judge 
for his disposition with their eyes open. The PMC did not, so far as 
we are told. To the contrary, after he failed to persuade the judge to 
press for a $200 million settlement, Special Master Shapiro told the 
PMC that "they would never get the defendants to go above $180 mil-
lion" (p. 159; emphasis added) even though he had by then concluded 
that the defendants could easily be convinced to pay more. No doubt 
the PMC lawyers, unlike Dow's lawyer, did not call the judge an "ide-
alist" when they found out what really happened. 
Unfortunately, Professor Schuck does not give us tools to evaluate 
the judge's settlement figure. 76 Certainly one must sympathize with 
the judge's desire not to promote groundless litigation. But if he be-
lieved these plaintiffs' suit groundless, should he have put his energies 
into promoting a settlement? Surely judges ought not foster efforts by 
plaintiffs to pump up the settlement value of their cases by trading on 
the transaction costs of litigation77 - the "orangemail" criticized by 
the New York Times. The PMC's preparation problems, indeed, may 
have strongly suggested to the judge that he would have to direct a 
verdict against plaintiffs. That is what some of the PMC lawyers 
claimed they understood him to be saying when he urged them to ac-
cept $180 million. But the PMC's pre-trial projections suggested that 
if they won, the jury would award over $1 billion, so while the 
probability of success was low the potential dimension of success was 
high. This was seemingly important to defendants as well, for $180 
million is more than a nuisance amount. By the time the settlement 
was reached on the eve of the trial, defendants' additional legal costs 
social order by personal force, the endurance of social order requires that more ordinary people 
be vested with social power. There are not enough judges of Weinstein's caliber to go around; we 
have to rely on judges like Pratt. Indeed, given Professor Schuck's claims that Judge Weinstein 
misused his extraordinary intellectual powers, one may legitimately prefer more ordinary judges. 
75. See Marcus, Conflicts Among Circuits and Transfers Within the Federal Judicial System, 
93 YALE L.J. 677, 696-98, 706-07 n.183 (1984) (describing plaintiff's broad "venue privilege" 
and the rule against judge shopping). 
76. In an article addressing the economic analysis of settlements as illuminated by the Agent 
Orange litigation, Professor Schuck did note reasons why judges are poorly situated in general to 
predict litigation outcomes accurately. See Schuck, supra note 68, at 349-51 (1986). But at the 
same time he expressly declined to address the question "whether ..• settlement of a dispute can 
be said to be more or less ~ust' or desirable than the alternative of litigating to judgment." Id. at 
341 n.16. 
77. Cf Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 
COLUM. L. REV. 433, 454-58 (1986) (discussing utility of pleadings decisions to reduce risk of 
nuisance settlements). 
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must have been much less. Thus, there are myriad variables at work, 
and even a complete explanation of the process by which the judge 
reached his figure, though extremely interesting, might well not dispel 
the uneasiness it creates. 
This uneasiness is compounded by the judge's necessary role under 
class action procedure in deciding whether the settlement is fair and 
therefore should be approved.78 This process resulted in highly dra-
matic encounters between Judge Weinstein and veterans opposed to 
the settlement. The judge was not, of course, required to disapprove 
merely because of widespread opposition, 79 but he should have had an 
open mind. Whatever these sessions accomplished by way of catharsis 
for the veterans, however, it is hard to believe they had any impact on 
the judge's ultimate decision to approve the settlement he had sired. 
Having prevented his own special masters from making a deal at $200 
million, he could hardly be expected to change his views because some 
veterans said $180 million was not enough. As Professor Schuck 
points out, a fairness evaluation by the judge who acted as midwife to 
the settlement seems inherently flawed (pp. 178-79). 
The judge's role in the settlement therefore presents the central 
conundrum in the case. The uncertainty of the law regarding toxic 
torts and the fact this was a class action both contributed to the 
judge's influence on the settlement. Beyond doubt, Judge Weinstein 
was striving throughout to do justice, and all seem to concede the liti-
gation would never have gotten moving but for his efforts. Clearly he 
did achieve rough justice by assuring that some sort of judicial relief 
would flow to some veterans. But the judicial system and procedural 
theory will have to contend for the foreseeable future with the ques-
tion whether rough justice of this sort is an acceptable substitute for 
in-court adjudication according to announced rules. On this central 
issue, Professor Schuck has left us with a starting point but few direc-
tions. In a book of this sort, that may be all he could do. 
78. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e), a class action may be settled only with 
approval of the court. 
79. See TBK Partners, Ltd. v. Western Union Corp., 675 F.2d 456, 462-63 (2d Cir. 1982) 
(footnote omitted): 
Especially when a dispute centers on the sufficiency of a settlement fund .•. , majority 
opposition to a settlement tends to indicate that the settlement may not be adequate since 
class members presumably know what is in their own best interests. Nevertheless, majority 
opposition to a settlement cannot serve as an automatic bar to a settlement that a district 
judge, after weighing all the strengths and weaknesses of a case and the risks of litigation, 
determines to be manifestly reasonable. Preventing settlement in such circumstances not 
only deprives other class members of the benefits of a manifestly fair settlement and subjects 
them to the uncertainties of litigation, but, in this case, would most likely have resulted in 
the eventual disappointment of the objecting class members as well. 
In the Agent Orange litigation, of course, there was no way to ascertain majority sentiment given 
the enormous size of the class. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Agent Orange, well ... that's a case which is so extreme in so many 
respects as not to be useful for most of the problems that we have to deal 
with. 
- Chief Judge Jack Weinstein80 
Perhaps, on balance, it would be better not to generalize from the 
Agent Orange litigation experience, as it may be dangerous to genera-
lize from the Vietnam experience. But Professor Schuck clearly hoped 
to go beyond chronicling the Agent Orange story and, drawing upon 
it, to convey an apocalyptic message. The message he chose to empha-
size, however, seems to be the wrong one. Treated as a parable for the 
failure of the tort system, the Agent Orange story is a poor fit because 
it is such a special case. Even as a harbinger of mass exposure litiga-
tion it is of doubtful value; the recent books on asbestos and Dalkon 
Shield litigation suggest that the tort system serves a purpose in such 
cases. 
The truly apocalyptic implications relate to active judicial promo-
tion of settlement. In this, Agent Orange is a special case because of 
the extraordinary legal difficulties presented by toxic tort litigation. 
But the special features of the case do not prevent it from being a 
harbinger of things to come in judicial management of litigation. The 
array of settlement-inducing devices deployed by Judge Weinstein in 
Agent Orange can also be utilized in ordinary cases, and recent experi-
ence suggests that these techniques will not be limited to extraordinary 
cases. 81 Moreover, the enthusiasm for nonlitigated resolution of dis-
putes, which sometimes reaches religious fervor, 82 can encourage 
judges to prefer not-so-gentle persuasion to other means of resolving 
cases. As an extreme version of this judicial activity, Agent Orange 
does graphically depict the problem oflegitimacy that should be a cen-
tral issue on the agenda of the next decade. Determining whether this 
vision is truly apocalyptic must await further developments. 
80. J. Weinstein, Remarks, supra note 54. 
81. See R. MARCUS & E. SHERMAN, COMPLEX LmGATION 13 (1985) ("[I]t is obvious that 
complex litigation was the nose by which the camel of judicial control got into the litigation tent, 
and that complex litigation is providing a model for the handling of all litigation."). 
82. Cf. Ohio Civil ~ghts Commn. v. Dayton Christian Schools, 106 S. Ct. 2718 (1986), in 
which a teacher was fired for disregarding the "biblical chain of command" for resolving dis· 
putes. "The core of this doctrine, rooted in passages from the New Testament, is that one Chris-
tian should not take another Christian into courts of the State." 106 S. Ct. at 2721. 
